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1Signaling Credit-Worthiness: Land Titles, Banking Practices
and Access to Formal Credit in Indonesia∗





It is often suggested that the poor are credit-rationed due to their lack of formal
collateral. Using a household survey from Indonesia, we estimate the impact of having a
land title on formal credit access. Adopting an instrumental variable approach, we ﬁnd
that having a formal title signiﬁcantly increases a household’s probability of ever having
had a formal loan and the observed loan amount. Why land titles increase access to
credit is still not clear. Incorporating data from a unique survey of bankers in Indonesia,
we will argue that possessing a formal title increases a household’s incidences of formal
credit not because the value of the title as collateral but because of what possessing a
title signals about the household to the banker. We apply a simple model of contract
choice to show how title can act as an indirect signal.
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21 Introduction
What are the channels through which land titles could aﬀect access to formal credit? Pol-
icymakers have long argued that formalizing property rights equips a landowner with a
collateralizable asset. In fact, one of the main justiﬁcations for large-scale land titling pro-
grams that have been sponsored by the World Bank and other aid organizations is that they
increase access to credit for the poor. The idea behind formal land title as collateral is that
there exists the possibility of a legal transfer of the pledged asset if the borrower defaults. If
creditors cannot feasibly foreclose then we would not expect formal titles to directly aﬀect
credit access. But formal land titles may have informational value to the banker above
and beyond their value as collateral. Possessing a title could signal credit-worthiness. In
Indonesia, as in many developing countries, obtaining a title is a lengthy and costly process.
Therefore having a title provides information about unobservables such as one’s degree of
integration into the formal system. The central argument of this paper is that land titles
in Indonesia are important not because they serve as collateral but because of what they
signal about the loan applicant.
To make this argument we need to answer two further questions. First, what is title
signaling to banks? And second, why is it that land titles as collateral are not crucial
for determining the credit supply in Indonesia? Land titles could signal the ability to
interact within formal rules, business-minded characteristics or the condition of assets. To
answer the second question we will use three observations relevant to banking practices in
Indonesia. First of all, land can serve as collateral without being titled. Households can
use informal land documents that demonstrate ownership but are not legally transferable.
Second, even having a land title does not necessarily guarantee its full transferability. And
third, collateral itself may not be the most important determinant of either receiving the
loan or the size of the loan. We should note that there are of course reasons why land title
may provide a good form of collateral.1 However these reasons typically rely on a well-
functioning legal infrastructure as well as fairly active land markets or assume that these
will develop along with widespread use of land titles. In this paper we will by necessity
focus on partial or local short term eﬀects.
Drawing from ﬁeld observations and a mail survey of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) unit
heads that we conducted, we argue that for the relatively small loans we are considering
the legal process to foreclose or collect on collateral is too costly. In fact even the process
of oﬃcially registering the collateral is too costly.2 Consequently banks use other means
to ensure repayment. Also not all formal loan applicants with title use it as collateral.
Therefore we can separately identify the eﬀect of having a title versus oﬀering it as collateral
1See deSoto [2000].
2Obviously we must emphasize that just because foreclosure is not observed very often is not an argument
that collateral is not at work. A simple game-theoretic framework will yield a Nash equilibrium where no
one defaults yet the possibility of foreclosure is real.
3on the formal loan amount received. The eﬀect of the possession of title is positive and
signiﬁcant while the diﬀerence between oﬀering an informal land document as security in
place of a land title is not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests to us that the signaling
role of title is more important than its collateral role. At ﬁrst glance one might be surprised
that possessing a land title and not oﬀering it as collateral is not considered a bad sign by
the bank.3 Obviously one must ask what people are oﬀering as security in place of the title.
The answer in our data is that in the place of contingent contracts securitized by collateral,
households choose to take ﬁxed income non-contingent contracts that are guaranteed by
salary.
The possession of a land title permits signaling via contract choice. Although our main
argument does not rely on title functioning as an indirect signal, we present this application
of contract theory for several important reasons. The detailed data set that we have allows
us to ask this relatively speciﬁc and to our knowledge unexplored question. And, most
importantly, it illustrates in a simple way that even though land title is not essential to
receiving a loan, land title can still provide relevant information in the loan decision. It is
precisely the fact that a household has a title but does not oﬀer it as security that reveals
information.
We adopt the model in Spier [1992] to explain this situation. Contracts with fewer
contingencies provide less insurance to a risk averse household but avoid transaction costs.
Choosing a non-contingent contract could indicate transactions costs outweigh the insurance
premium for a given household. In the model we present, choosing a non-contingent contract
is also how the household signals its good qualities over a certain range of transaction costs.
We will show that among the population that is both titled and has outside employment
(and therefore is eligible for a ﬁxed income loan), those that choose ﬁxed income loans have
better observable characteristics such as educational attainment.
We use the Microﬁnance Access and Services Survey (MASS) 2002 which was conducted
by BRI in order to evaluate households’ microﬁnance activity and potential new markets.
Indonesia has an extensive rural banking system mostly supplied by BRI Units. The survey
provides disaggregated data on household economic activities, assets and loans for over 1400
households in 70 villages across 6 provinces. Most importantly for each loan reported it
includes what was oﬀered to securitize the loan. These households have not been aﬀected
by any large-scale systematic land titling program. Therefore the household choice to title
depends on certain unobservable characteristics, such as proclivity for business, that may
also be associated with the desire to obtain formal loans. Also, the sophistication of credit
markets may be correlated with the sophistication of the titling system. For these reasons
title is likely to be endogenous.
The endogeneity of land title has not been adequately addressed in the previous liter-
3Bester [1985] shows that banks can screen for types with low repayment costs by oﬀering loan contracts
with higher collateral requirements at a lower interest rate.
4ature. Either the problem is ignored or a systematic titling program is used. In the ﬁrst
instance, the empirical estimation results will most likely be biased. In the second instance,
the results will miss any eﬀect of title as a signal. To accurately measure the eﬀect of land
title on access to credit we will make use of the instrumental variables technique. Our
instrumental variables come from Potensi Desa 2003 (PODES 2003), a government survey
of Indonesian village heads, and the MASS survey. We use this village-level information
to supplement our household survey. The two instrumental variables that we will consider
are the head of household’s age and whether rice paddies are the village’s primary form of
income. Using a bivariate probit model, we estimate the eﬀect of title on the probability
of having had a formal bank loan. We ﬁnd that at the sample median the marginal eﬀect
of having a title on the probability of having had a formal bank loan is 21% (with a robust
standard error of 10%). We also estimate the eﬀect on loan amounts using a Heckman
selection model and ﬁnd that possessing a land title increases the predicted loan amount,
although the eﬀect is not as large as one might expect.
Implications for policy on land titling programs can now be considered. If land titles
inﬂuence banks through what they signal about the household then the beneﬁts of a large-
scale systematic titling program on access to credit are less than when eﬀect of title is via
collateral. This is assuming that systematic titling programs do not lead to large changes
in banking practices.
This rest of the paper precedes as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy discuss the
previous literature that has looked at the question of how land titles aﬀect access to credit.
Then we outline some important features of the legal and credit settings in Indonesia which
motivate our approach to this question. In section 4 we present the implications of a simple
contracting and signaling model. Section 5 describes our data sets, section 6 presents our
empirical results and section 7 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
The positive eﬀect of title on access to credit is purported to be well established by Deininger
and Binswanger [1999]. Nevertheless in our survey of the literature we observe mixed results.
As noted in our introduction, we believe we are the ﬁrst paper to try to instrument for title
without using a land titling program as the instrument. Table 1 lists previous empirical
work on how land titles aﬀect incidences of formal bank credit. In some ways it is not so
surprising to be ﬁnding contradictory results. After all, these studies took place in diﬀerent
countries with diﬀerent sets of institutions governing the credit and land markets. Also
some studies consider systematic titling programs where possessing title can be viewed as
relatively exogenous to the credit decision and others study “sporadic” (or individually
obtained) titles which require more eﬀort for households. This is the case we are studying
in Indonesia.
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The empirical problem of measuring the eﬀect of possession of title on the probability
of obtaining a formal bank loan is not as straightforward as it might appear. First of all,
there is the necessity of separating the eﬀects of title on the supply of formal credit from the
eﬀects on the demand for credit. Feder et al. [1988] was the ﬁrst to identify this problem.
They model it by letting observed credit equal the minimum of supplied credit and credit
demanded but resort to assuming excess demand in their empirical work. Field and Torero
[2004] solve the problem by using detailed information on diﬀerent banks’ requirements for
loans. They measure the eﬀect of title on credit access only among banks that require
title. In this way, they control for the possibility that having a title will increase demand
for credit. Most studies simply assume that there exists excess demand for formal credit
which as Kochar [1997] argues is far from ideal. She stresses that existence of informal
credit markets may cause the empirical data to misrepresent the extent of credit rationing.
Institutional credit may be accessed less because individuals’ demand for credit may be
satisﬁed by the informal sector.
We also should mention that not all development experts consider titling programs to
be appropriate in certain situations. Customary land rights may be diﬃcult to describe
or put into an adequate formal title. Atwood [1990] argues that land titling can create
uncertainty which undermines local relationships in his study of sub-Saharan countries. In
areas where customary land rights are strong and land markets are not really relevant, titling
systems do little to beneﬁt the community and may disrupt the subtle societal interface;
only in areas where rights are not well-established by the community and land markets do
matter, can titling systems possibly have a beneﬁcial role (Hoﬀ et al. [1993]). In an urban
6area, Lanjouw and Levy [2002] show how community relationships can substitute for formal
claims on assets. This is of particular concern in our context due to the strong adherence to
adat law in certain areas of Indonesia. Nevertheless, even if tenure security can be achieved
through informal means, it is hard to imagine that large amounts of formal credit can be
accessed on the basis of this same community relationship.4
3 Institutional Background
Land Law in Indonesia
The Indonesian legal system is an interesting mix of Dutch, Muslim and customary (adat)
law. Although the written law should apply across provinces, the complicated interaction
between the three traditions of law provides ample discretion for judges. With respect to
foreclosure law borrowers rather than lenders are generally favored. Foreclosure is a socially
sensitive issue and the legal practice of foreclosure in Indonesia is unpredictable and lengthy.
The current system of titling should be understood in the context of how land rights have
been established previously, especially in areas where adat law is still respected. Evidence
of ownership can come in a variety of forms. The most formal of these informal rights to
land is a land deed or akte.5 A less formal but perhaps locally stronger right is the girik or
petok which is a use claim on land that comes from the customary law. Documents known
as Letter C or D are guaranteed by the village leader and can be inherited. In the MASS
survey land parcels with formal land titles are slightly overrepresented (45% of land parcels
have formal land titles, 12% have akte, 21% have either a girik, petok or letter C or D,
and ﬁnally 10% have only tax receipts to demonstrate ownership of that parcel). Very few
households in our sample, only 4% of landowners, have no documents at all.
The National Land Administration Agency (BPN) grants titles to non-forest land.6 Out
of the 80 million land parcels on the ﬁscal tax register less than 27 million are on the legally
titled register. Currently about 1.3 million new titles are registered sporadically each year
and the total number of land parcels is estimated to by growing by more than 1 million each
year.7 The process of getting a title is both lengthy and costly. The usual process requires
a letter from the village head verifying that the land is in one’s possession and a survey
with the applicant funding the boundary markers, the transportation costs and the survey
fee. Transportation costs are not trivial. After this is completed, the document must be
veriﬁed, mapped and ﬁnally certiﬁed; in total, the process can easily take one year. Once
the certiﬁcate is obtained, a tax must be paid on the right to have title on a piece of land
(this is a one time tax; this is not a property tax or tax on the sale). Anecdotal evidence
reveals there are also signiﬁcant informal costs accumulated throughout the titling process.
4Though perhaps it is not that hard given the continual rise of micro-credit and group lending.
5It is a document that represents the purchase of a piece of land and is oﬃcially stamped and notarized.
6Land which has been designated as forest (roughly 60%) is handled by a separate Ministry of Forest.
7World Bank Project Appraisal Document, Report No: 28178-IND (2004)
7For example, the stated fee of a land certiﬁcate is around 300,000 Rp. (approximately $33),
but when we asked what the actual fee was we received answers ranging from 1-2 million
Rp. (approximately $111-$222).
Credit Market Setting and Banking Practices
In Indonesia, there is a wide range of ﬁnancial services including both private and gov-
ernment banks in the formal sector and ROSCA’s, neighborhood cooperatives and money
lenders in the informal sector. The bank that we focus on, BRI, is the fourth largest bank
in Indonesia with 10% of market share as measured by the total assets held by banks. It
also has the most extensive banking presence in rural areas. The primary BRI bank in these
areas is the BRI Unit, a bank that deals with smaller sized loans. It has over 4000 oﬃces
reaching roughly a third of all households in Indonesia.8
In general, BRI Units attempt to reach a part of the population that might not have
had the opportunity to participate in the formal ﬁnancial sector. The emphasis of BRI
Units is small-scale in order to develop a personal relationship with the client. The BRI
approach allows discretion within a set of basic rules, for example, a loan above 20 million
Rp. (approximately $2200) must have approval from its central BRI Branch but there is
no one formula for accepting or rejecting loan applicants. Successful unit managers are
rewarded with more discretion and higher limits for lending without branch approval. Unit
managers are allowed to rely on notions such as “trustworthiness” when granting a loan.
We conducted a mail survey of 192 BRI Units across the same 6 provinces and 12
districts where the MASS was conducted. Our response rate was over 60%. Most of the
surveys were answered directly by the unit manager. The ﬁrst point to emphasize again is
that BRI Units do accept other forms of land documents as collateral besides just oﬃcial
land titles. In our mail sample, only 42% of loans that are securitized by some form of
collateral are done so with a land title certiﬁcate. But almost 40% of all loans are not
collateralized at all, instead they are guaranteed by deductions from future salary (ﬁxed
income). This is similar to what was found in the MASS survey where 33% of the 326 loans
recorded at BRI Units or Branches were collateralized by a formal land title.
More revealing is the fact that when asked the most important factor in considering
whether to grant a loan 82% answered the character of the individual. Moreover, when
determining the repayment ability of the applicant (which determines the loan size that
the applicant is eligible for), the most important factor was cash-ﬂow (66%) followed by
character (20%). Collateral appeared as an answer only once as the most important factor
for determining repayment capacity and never as the answer to the most important factor in
considering whether to grant a loan at all. Our survey also asked if having a land title would
increase the likelihood of success for a loan application. The answer is in the aﬃrmative for
8BRI has been extensively studied in the microﬁnance literature. For more information on the history
and practices of BRI, see Maurer [1999].
860% of our sample though only 29% say that having land title will increase the likelihood
of receiving a higher loan amount than someone without a land title.9
Repayment rates are very high in the BRI Units, above 95% in most areas (Johnston
et al. [2001]). As a policy, BRI prefers to avoid using foreclosure to enforce repayment.
Foreclosure is described as a very rare event anecdotally but our survey indicates that it
does happen; 37% of unit managers report having foreclosed on a client at least once.10 Since
the legal cost of foreclosure is high, we might expect to see instead forced or encouraged
sales of pledged assets. In our survey, 77% do indicate encouraging clients to sell collateral
in order to repay the loan at some point in the past year. The existence of encouraged sale
of clients assets may indicate that the asset is not fully transferable. In order to maintain
the relationship with the bank the client ﬁnds a way to liquify at least part of the asset. This
suggests again that legally titled collateral might not be that important since the courts are
being bypassed.
Drawing on the microﬁnance literature (Morduch [1999]) we identify several repayment
mechanisms that seem to be at work in place of collateral: dynamic incentives, one-time
incentives and monitoring. BRI Units promote repayment through progressive lending, the
practice of allowing clients to borrow larger amounts in the future if they repay on time.11
Another method is to oﬀer one-time interest payment rebates for those customers that
repay on time.12 Also the supply of credit can be limited to members of a social network in
order to lessen monitoring costs (assuming that the social network naturally monitors its
members to some degree). When asked how new clients ﬁnd out about BRI and its services,
88% of the bankers said it was through friends and families. By signaling characteristics
associated with desire or ability to repay or membership of a social network, the client can
help solve the information and the incentive problem. These methods show that banks can
(and do) use methods other than collateral requirements to solve the moral hazard and
adverse selection problem.
These mechanisms have costs that may seem higher than the expected costs of the
self-help methods of collecting collateral common in the US.13 Given the legal premise for
self-help methods in Indonesia is weak, it is unclear that formal collateral will have lower
enforcement costs than the methods described above. The important distinction between
the two is that these costs do not depend on the ex-post collection or seizure of assets in case
of default. In fact, default is often hard to characterize when these repayment mechanisms
9This is similar to what our empirical results will show - having a land title makes a household more
likely to receive a formal loan but conditional on receiving a loan, a title has less inﬂuence on the size of the
loan.
10This number actually surprises us; we would have asked for how many times in past few years but we
were almost sure that answer would be zero.
11We ﬁnd that the mean of the reported maximum loan given to repeat customers without formal title
but with some land document is twice that of new customers with a similar land document.
12See Robinson [2001].
13For example, in the case of repossession a bank could hire someone to non-violently seize the collateral
in order to resell without going to court.
9are in place. Often debt-rescheduling is preferred to a declaration of default for a variety of
social and economic reasons.
4 Signaling with Contract
As we discussed in the introduction titles can signal for unobservable characteristics. In
this section we show that title can also signal type indirectly through the choice of loan
contract. Diﬀerent contracts have diﬀerent costs for a household. Households may choose
diﬀerent contracts depending on their insurance premium and transaction costs. Following
Spier [1992], we show that in the presence of asymmetric information households may choose
loan contracts to signal type.
Basic Set-up of Model
A risk averse household owns a productive asset that with a ﬁxed loan size, L, yields a
stochastic output Q ∈ {QL,QH} with QL < QH. A household is a good type, g, with
probability π ∈ (0,1) or a bad type, b, with probability 1 − π. Let pi = P(QH|type i) and
pg > pb. The household has expected utility V (x) − y where x is the household’s income
and y are the transaction costs. V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0 as usual.
The bank is a risk-neutral player in a competitive market (zero proﬁts) that knows π
but cannot observe the type of the household. The bank’s opportunity cost of lending L is
Lo. A court can verify Q but not type, hence contracts can depend only on Q. A contract
is considered contingent if the repayment schedule, {RL,RH}, depends on realization of
output and non-contingent if RL = RH. Contingent contracts incur an ex-ante cost of k
paid by the household.
We think of ex-ante transaction costs as being both the drafting costs, psychological
costs and expected costs of avoiding default. The distinction between ex-post costs and
expected ex-ante costs is one of veriﬁcation. If the bank or the household must pay to
verify the actual outcome given a dispute, then the renegotiation process must be taken
into account in the contract selection decision. As mentioned in the previous section, in
our setting banks tend to use enforcement mechanisms that avoid veriﬁcation costs such as
denial of future access. That is not to say that the threat of going to court is not real. Only
that it is unlikely that veriﬁcation costs play a signiﬁcant role for small-sized loans.14
Timing of the game is as follows. Households observe their type and pick contract
{RL,RH} from among the bank’s menu of contracts (that leave it indiﬀerent between of-
fering the loan or not). If the household refuses all loans then it gets nothing and the bank
gets Lo. If they pick one then the bank gives the household the loan of size L after which
14Spier models the case when veriﬁcation costs are paid by the household. She gets a similar result that in
the presence of asymmetric information. Good types signal their type with a non-contingent contract over
a range of veriﬁcation costs. In our case, the important diﬀerence between enforcement costs that require
veriﬁcation is that veriﬁcation costs are paid by the bank.
10Q is realized. We assume that there exists costless veriﬁcation of the contract. So the
household will never repays more than the true amount and the bank refuses any oﬀers that
in expected terms give it less than its outside option.
Assuming that the household picks the contract {RL,RH} then given p and k the house-
hold’s expected payoﬀ is:
EQV (RL,RH;p,k) =
(
pV (QH − RH) + (1 − p)V (QL − WL) − k if RH 6= RL
pV (QH − RH) + (1 − p)V (QL − WL) if RH = RL
(1)
Full information
Suppose the bank observes the household’s type and therefore p, then the full-information





pRH + (1 − p)RL ≥ Lo (2)
Clearly the best non-contingent contract the household can choose is {Lo,Lo} and the best
contingent contract is one that fully insures the household and leaves the bank indiﬀerent,
i.e.
{RL,RH} = {Lo − p(QH − QL),Lo + (1 − p)(QH − QL)} (3)
Type i is indiﬀerent between the full-insurance contingent contract and the best non-
contingent contract when
V (piQH + (1 − pi)QL − Lo) − k = piV (QH − Lo) + (1 − pi)V (QL − Lo) (4)
Let k(p) be the k that solves the above equality for a type with probability of a high
realization of p and note that k(0) = 0 and k(1) = 0. Diﬀerentiating k(p) we get
k0(p) = (QH − QL)V 0(pQH + (1 − p)QL − Lo) − V (QH − Lo) + V (QL − Lo) (5)
which is negative if p is large and positive if p is small. First notice that k(p) has a unique
maximum since k00(p) < 0 implying that k is positive over the interval [0,1]. Then as long
as pb > argmaxk(p), then kg = k(pg) < k(pb) = kb.
Therefore we can conclude that if k is small (k < kg), then both types choose contingent
contracts and if k is too large (k > kb) then both choose non-contingent contracts. For the
intermediate range (k ∈ [kg,kb]), if pb and pg are suﬃciently large, then the good type oﬀers
a non-contingent contract and the bad type oﬀers a contingent contract.
11Asymmetric information
Suppose now that the bank does not observe the household’s type. The full-information
contract may no longer be sustainable. Under zero transaction costs both types prefer the
contingent contract. The bad type strictly prefers the contingent contract the good type
would oﬀer under full information. Since the (IR) constraint binds in the full information
case, it would be violated if the bad and good type pool on the good type’s optimal full
information contract. Consequently, the good type solves for the optimal contract under





pRH + (1 − p)RL ≥ Lo (6)
and
EQV (RL,RH;pb,k) ≤ V ∗
FI(pb,k) (7)
where V ∗
FI(pb,k) is the optimal contract under full information.
Similar to the full information case, the best non-contingent contract the household can
choose is {Lo,Lo}. If k is small, then both types choose contingent contracts and if k is too
large (k > kb) then both choose non-contingent contracts. But now the intermediate range
expands to [˜ k,kb] where ˜ k ∈ [0,kg) and given pb and pg are suﬃciently large, then the good
type oﬀers a non-contingent contract and the bad type oﬀers a contingent contract over this
range. To see why this is the case, notice that if the incentive compatibility (IC), equation
7, binds, then the best contingent contract is dominated by the full insurance contract
under full information. The IC binds when k ≤ kg by arguments given above. Then the
good type will strictly prefer the non-contingent contract at k = kg. Finally, notice that
the payoﬀ of the contingent contract is decreasing in k and when k = 0 the good type
prefers the contingent contract. Thus there exists a ˜ k ∈ [0,kg). The intuition behind the
signaling outcome is good types are able to self-insure better than bad types because they
have a higher expected return. Good types choose to distinguish themselves by showing a
non-reliance on insurance.
One attractive extension of the model for this paper would allow loan size to vary
by project. A simple modiﬁcation treats projects as exogenous. Each project requires
a ﬁxed cost to start. We could think of expensive investment projects, E, and cheap
ones, C, requiring loans from a bank. Now the bank has an opportunity cost that varies
with the size of the loan, LE
o > LC
o . Raising the bank’s outside option tightens the (IR)
constraint. Holding QH and QL ﬁxed, a tighter (IR) constraint, equation 6, lowers the
household’s value of the loan contract. Since the (IR) constraint always binds in the full
information case, higher investment makes it more diﬃcult for the good type to signal over
12the intermediate range of transaction costs in the asymmetric case. Thus this model has a
convenient interpretation if land title has an eﬀect on loan amounts. The collateral eﬀect
of land title should dominate the informational value of land title as loan size increases
holding all else constant.
5 Data Description
We will be utilizing data from two diﬀerent sources in this paper. Our main source is the
BRI MASS 2002 household survey. We also have additional village level information from a
survey of village heads conducted annually by the Indonesian government, PODES 2003.15
In the rest of this section we will brieﬂy describe each data set and give some summary
statistics.
MASS data
This survey consists of over 1400 households spread across 70 diﬀerent villages, both rural
and urban, in the provinces of West Java, East Java, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, and Papua.16 It slightly over-samples poor households especially in rural areas
(Johnston and Morduch [2003]).
Table 2: Percentage Titled by Province
Province %Titled N
West Java .204 230
East Java .510 204
West Kalimantan .634 232
East Kalimantan .391 220
North Sulawesi .500 220
Papua .603 204
Total .471 1310
Source: BRI MASS 2002
Table 2 gives the percentage of titled households in each province. We exclude the
landless in this table and in all results we present. For households with multiple land
parcels, we label them as titled if any of their land is titled.17 Other land documents
refer to land deeds, customary or traditional land documents, and tax receipts as discussed
earlier. In general, titled households are less common in rural areas (29% ) than urban
areas (65%).
15Potensi Desa Statistik or Village Potential Statistics which was actually collected in 2002.
16Except for West Java where all households sampled were rural.
17Alternatively it could also be the the fraction of value of the household’s total land assets that is titled.
In practice this distinction is almost irrelevant in our data set because even though 352 of our households
do report having more than one land or garden plot all but 57 of these households have either all all their
plots titled or all untitled.
13We have data on 645 distinct loans from about 575 diﬀerent households. On average,
formal bank loans are signiﬁcantly larger than loans from other sources and the majority
of reported loans are formal.18 The most common formal loan use reported was working
capital for an existing venture (37%) followed by home improvement (24%). While working
capital is a very general term, we can note that loan uses such as diversiﬁcation or starting a
new business were listed less than 2% of the time. We can classify roughly 40% of our loans
as being used for production purposes and the remaining 60% as being for consumption or
other.
Because our loan amounts are from all diﬀerent years, with the majority of loans in
1998-2002 (only 9% of the formal loans are from the earlier 1990’s), we normalized the loan
amounts by converting to U.S. dollars. Table 3 breaks down the formal loan amounts by
the type of security oﬀered.
Table 3: Formal Loan Amounts in U.S. dollars by type of Security Used
Security Used Mean Loan Amount Std N
Land title certiﬁcate 1124 1340 93
Other land certiﬁcate 629 444 60
Fixed Income 903 767 177
Vehicle ownership 1046 1368 16
Savings/time deposit 105 . 1
Home/appliance/furniture 426 496 2
No security 446 475 18
Total 893 959 367
Source: BRI MASS 2002
Table 4 gives the summary statistics for both the covariates that we will be including
in our estimations and other descriptive statistics. FormalBank equals one if the household
ever reports having a formal loan.
PODES 2003
Table 5 gives the summary statistics for village level covariates from the PODES data set
that we will be including in our estimations. These statistics are calculated using only
the villages in the BRI MASS sample. Overall they are roughly comparable to the full
Indonesian census of village heads. We have slightly more villages with registered councils
(65% in our sample as opposed to 58% overall). RicePaddy = 1 if rice paddies are the
village’s primary form of income. Due to the fact that our sample is split roughly equally
between urban and rural, we have less villages with rice paddies as their main source of
income than the Indonesian average of 63%.
1874% are formal bank loans, 14% are microbank loans, 12% are from other informal sources.
14Table 4: BRI MASS 2002 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Formalbank 0.287 0.453 0 1 1310
Distance to bank (km) 6.778 9.907 0 56 1297
FormalLoanAmtDollars 890 955 5.67 11687 371
MicroLoanAmtDollars 353 537 6.63 2922 76
InformalLoanAmtDollars 355 803 6.94 4926 58
Total Value of Fixed Assets (approx.US$) 5920 10800 2.5 157000 1310
Log total ﬁxed asset value 17.229 1.138 10.127 21.174 1310
Income per cap/poverty line 3.309 4.737 0.011 69.819 1308
Household size 4.437 1.729 1 13 1310
Female household head (HH) 0.093 0.291 0 1 1310
HH’s education (years) 7.99 3.943 0 16 1310
HH’s age 46.332 11.87 20 87 1309
Years in village 27.759 16.102 1 99 1303
Has salary 0.411 0.492 0 1 1310
Mean income/povline in village 3.38 2.113 0.409 13.328 1310
Mean years land is held in village 17.623 5.773 3 40.034 1310
Rural 0.604 0.489 0 1 1310
Table 5: PODES 2003 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Village has bank 0.202 0.401 0 1 1310
Village has registered council 0.646 0.478 0 1 1292
Population density (adultpop/hectare) 28.17 52.95 0.06 270 1310
RicePaddy 0.428 0.495 0 1 1310
6 Empirical Strategy and Results
In both rural and urban areas, more titled households do have formal loans (40% of ti-
tled households have had a formal bank loan compared to only 20% of other documented
households) and as we saw above loans securitized by formal land titles tend to be larger
on average. We will ﬁrst consider a straightforward test that looks at how possessing title
aﬀects credit access while controlling for other observables that might also inﬂuence credit
access.
yi = Xiβ + γtitlei + i
where yi, the outcome of interest, is either an indicator variable of whether household i has
ever had a formal bank loan or the total amount of formal bank loans which have been
extended to household i in the recent past. Xi consists of both household and village-level
covariates as well as subdistrict ﬁxed eﬀects.
We have to make a further assumption on the error structure when the outcome of
interest is binary and we are using a Probit model. Letting y∗ be the latent variable, the
15unobserved value to the bank of giving a loan to household i, we have:
y∗ = Xβ + γtitle +  where  ∼ N(0,1)
y = I[y∗ > 0]
P(y = 1|X) = Φ(Xβ + γtitle)
We also report on the following speciﬁcation and compare γtitl to γothr.
yi = Xiβ + γtitllnValTitledLandi + γothrlnValOtherLandi + γasslnValOtherAsseti + i (8)
One of the main problems with either of these approaches is that as discussed in the
introduction possessing a title is hardly an exogenous variable in the MASS data set so
therefore we do not expect E(|title,X) = 0 to hold and our estimates will be biased.
Initially we expected γ to be biased upwards because we thought that the main source
of endogeneity woud be unobservables such as entrepeneurship that would be positively
correlated with both high loan amounts and having title. To account for this problem we
will make use of instrumental variables.
To be precise, in order for z ∈ Z to be an instrumental variable for title the following
two conditions must hold: (1) Cov(,z) = 0 and (2) Corr(title,z|X) 6= 0. In the following
section, we will argue that household head’s age and whether or not rice paddies are the
village’s primary source of income are valid instruments. To instrument in the binary
variable case we will use the bivariate probit model; that is we also estimate the probability
of a household being titled (including our instruments) and allow the error terms in the two
equations to be correlated.
Next we will address the fact that the reduced form approach does not let us separate
supply from demand. One way to think what we are doing above is that we are assuming
excess demand for credit so that any changes in observed credit can be attributed to changes
in supply. This is not very satisfactory so in section 6.3 we will discuss how we can make
use of some hypothetical questions that were included in BRI MASS survey in order to
separate the demand eﬀects from the supply eﬀects. While obviously the use of hypothetical
questions is not without its problems, they have been used in a wide sample of work with
relative success (Barham et al. [1996]).
A third issue is the sample selection problem. We would like to know the eﬀect of land
title on loan size for the general population. We need to correct for any selectivity bias due
to the correlation between those who received a formal bank loan and the loan size. Below
16is the selection model we will estimate.
y = Xβ + γtitle + υ
ys = I[Zδ + µtitle + νs > 0] where νs ∼ N(0,1)
E(υ|νs) = ηνs
In this model, Z and ys are always observed while y is only observed only when ys = 1. We
assume that υ and νs are independent of Z with zero mean but later relax this assumption
to consider the possible endogeneity of title. In order to ensure suﬃcient variation in the
selection equation, we let Z equal the X controls plus household distance to the nearest
bank and whether a village has a bank. Both these variables inﬂuence whether a household
has or wants a loan but are unlikely to inﬂuence the loan size after including other controls.
6.1 Instrumenting for Title
In this section, we provide justiﬁcation for our two instruments for possession of a formal
land title.
Whether rice paddies are a village’s primary source of income provides a measure of how
likely a household is to be titled. Rice paddies demand irrigation which is an investment-
intensive activity that can establish ownership. Considering the high cost of obtaining land
titles, we would expect to see less titles in areas where there are other means of establishing
ownership. Indeed, in rural areas the probability of being titled given that rice paddies are
the primary source of income in your village is 18% contrasted with 48% if it is not. In
urban areas there is a smaller diﬀerence (59% as opposed to 66%), but in our sample only
3 urban villages have rice paddies as their primary source of income.
Since the extent of rice paddy cultivation depends on geographical and climate char-
acteristics, we argue that the rice paddy variable should not be correlated with the error
term after we include dummy variables indicating in which subdistrict a household is lo-
cated. This instrument might be subject to the criticism that it is a measure of the overall
development level of the village. In order to attempt to mitigate this problem, we include
the mean income level in the village, the village population density and the village mean
number of years that land assets are held (to control for the degree of activity in the land
markets). We also include a measure of village infrastructure - whether the village has a
registered council.
Since obtaining title is a time consuming, costly process, the age of the household head
describes to some extent the number of potential opportunities a given household has had
to obtain title. Controlling for wealth and income and other important variables, being
older should lead to a higher probability that the household has had enough time to save
the money necessary for title and to go through the process of obtaining title. In our data,
this age variable is positively correlated with whether the household has a land title (see
17ﬁgure 1). Age should not be correlated with any innate personal characteristics important
to the loan decision. Of course, age could be associated with village status or responsibility
that would aﬀect the loan decision. To control for this we include the years a household
has been in a village, whether or not the household head is female, the education of the
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After running the ﬁrst stage of 2SLS, we are able to check if our instruments do explain
title after including other controls. The two instruments discussed here all always have
coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero both individually and jointly. And
in the speciﬁcations we present below they pass the typical overidentiﬁcation test which
suggests that they do not inﬂuence credit access except via land title.
In the following sections we present both the naive results if one simply includes whether
or not a household has a formal land title as an exogenous right-hand side variable and the
instrumented results for the following dependent variables - whether or not the household
has ever had a formal bank loan, whether or not they were judged feasible for a formal bank
loan (see section 6.3), the log of the feasible loan amounts, the log of formal loans amounts.
We chose to put in ﬁxed eﬀects at the sub-district level since BRI Units lending areas are
usually a sub-district. In general we ﬁnd that including the geographic dummies increases
the precision with which we are able to measure the eﬀect of title but our results are robust
to their exculsion.
186.2 Formalbank
After controlling for household and village-level characteristics and including subdistrict
level dummies to control for any unobserved geographic diﬀerences, we ﬁnd a positive
correlation between having had a formal bank loan and possessing a land title (see columns
(1) and (2) in table 8 for a linear probability model and table 9 for the probit speciﬁcation).
We ﬁnd that using the probit model, at the mean, switching to having a land title from
being completely untitled increases your probability of having a formal loan by 11% (with a
robust standard error of 4%).19 This suggests to us that land titles may function as a signal
of credit-worthiness since other land documents are also used as collateral but nevertheless
titles have an eﬀect on the probability of a household having formal credit.
In table 10 we present the speciﬁcation described by equation 10. γtitl is positive and
signiﬁcantly greater than zero. In magnitude it is almost three times as large as γothr and
γothr fails to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero in the speciﬁcation including subdistrict
dummies. Note that titled land also has more of an eﬀect than other assets. An increase in
one standard deviation of lnV alTitledLand would increase the probability of having had a
formal bank loan by almost 11%. This result could be interpreted as support for either the
collateral or signaling story. It simply suggests that titled land has a diﬀerernt eﬀect on the
bank’s decision compared to other documented land.
After instrumenting for the possession of title (columns (3) and (4) of table 9) we see that
the eﬀect of title has actually increased to 21% (with a robust standard error of 11%). In the
bivariate probit, ρ, (the correlation of the error terms across the two equations) is −.353 and
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero indicating an endogeneity problem.20 The unobservables
aﬀecting the titling decision correlate negatively with the unobservables determining formal
bank usage after controlling for other characteristics. Given that our model is correctly
speciﬁed, our instruments are valid and are distributed somewhat randomly across the




The BRI MASS survey was conducted by BRI loan oﬃcers that usually work in diﬀerent
areas. After they conducted each survey, the enumerators were asked to privately judge
the household’s feasibility as a loan candidate. They reported whether they would grant
the household a loan and for how much and under what terms. These questions give us a
19The linear probability model gives similar results. The probability decreases to 9% (with a robust
standard error of 3%).
20In the instrumented linear probability model (column (4) in table 8) we also strongly reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity. The Wu-Hausman F(1,1218) = 7.20 with a p-value of .007 and the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman χ
2(1) = 7.46 with a p-value of .006
19measure of hypothetical supply. That is, without considering the eﬀects of title on credit
demand, we can evaluate whether title systematically aﬀects how much credit a household
is at least hypothetically eligible for. Given that these questions were answered by actual
BRI loan oﬃcers adds to their validity as a measure of credit supply. We run the same
speciﬁcations described above (naive probit and bivariate probit, see table 11) on whether a
household was judged feasible for a formal bank loan. We ﬁnd that after instrumenting and
including subdistrict dummies, possession of a title increases the probability at the median
of being judged feasible by 31%. This suggests to us that the reduced form estimates we
discussed in the previous section are driven by the supply side of the credit market.
In general the feasible loan amounts were comparable to actual loan amounts but many
households that have never had a formal loan were judged feasible. The average feasible
loan amount was almost 8 million Rp. or roughly $870. We choose to run a Tobit model to
account for the possible corner solution when the loan oﬃcer decided the household would
not be eligible for a formal bank loan. Accepting the distributional assumptions on the
error term in the Tobit model is preferred to OLS. After instrumenting title actually passed
the Wu-Hausman F test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 test for exogeneity.21 Therefore we
present only the OLS and Tobit results in table 12. We report the marginal eﬀects at the
mean conditional on being uncensored for the Tobit. We note that the results are similar to
the simple OLS model shown in column (1). In neither case does the possession of a land
title signiﬁcantly eﬀect the loan amount judged feasible for the household.
Credit Demand
The MASS survey also asked households how much credit they hypothetically would be
interested in obtaining. Of the 901 households that were judged feasible, 565 have never
had a formal bank loan. Their answers as to why they have never had a formal bank loan
can give us some insight into the question of demand for formal credit by those who are
hypothetically not credit-rationed. Over half of those who were judged feasible and have
never had a formal bank loan claim that it is because they do not want to be in debt.
They were then asked a series of hypothetical questions about their possible desired loan
amounts and conditions. We turn to the Heckman selection model to correct for possible
selection bias since we want to say something about how title aﬀects demand for credit
for the entire population. We ﬁnd that title almost has zero eﬀect on desired loan amount
even after correcting for the very plausible non-random assignment into this group who has
never had a formal loan (see table 13). The correlation between the error terms is negative
as expected: those who are less likely to have had a formal loan desire smaller loans.
However, this measure of demand is somewhat problematic because even after giving a
hypothetical loan amount over 80% still insisted that they had no intention of borrowing
21Wu-Hausman F(1,1119)=.0048 with a p-value of .945. Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ
2(1) = .0050 with a
p-value of .944
20formally. Their number one reason, given by 44%, was that they were concerned about
repayment. Those that were titled were equally likely to be worried about repayment as
others.
6.4 Loan Size
The next question would be whether having a formal title inﬂuences the size of observed
formal loans. The results presented in table 14 compare least squares estimates with es-
timates constructed using the Heckman procedure to correct for selection bias. Overall
we ﬁnd positive but weakly signiﬁcant eﬀects except in the case where we instrument over
just the sample of those who had formal loans (column (2)). However our instruments are
relatively poor predictors of title over this sample. Comparing column (1), OLS, to column
(3) which accounts for the selection we see that there are no huge changes and ρ is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero downplaying the importance of the selection. However in
the IV case, there are large diﬀerences when one considers the selection appropriately.22 In
column (4) we see that the impact of title on loan size is not huge; on average having a title
increases loan size by 66% of one standard deviation of LogFormalLoanAmt.
6.5 Security Oﬀered
In this section we look at whether the eﬀect of oﬀering diﬀerent types of security. We note
that among formal banks, almost all loans have some security.23 What is important for
us is whether the type of security oﬀered makes a diﬀerence among those who get formal
bank loans. Table 3 shows that the average loan size of those securitized by formal land
titles is signiﬁcantly larger than those securitized by other land documents. However when
we include dummy variables for the type of security oﬀered (missing category is oﬀering an
informal land document) we see that the coeﬃcient on oﬀering titled land as security is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level. We do this exercise with OLS on just the
selected sample of those who had formal bank loans (this tells us the eﬀect of title on those
who get formal bank loans) and using a Heckman selection model to estimate the general
eﬀect in the population. See table 15.
Despite the fact that the coeﬃcients on ﬁxed income fails to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the coeﬃcient on land title as security, we would still like to argue that there are
systematic diﬀerences between those that choose ﬁxed income contracts and those that use
land titles as security. To do this we need to consider the population that has both outside
employment and a formal land title. We label a household as a good type if they have
a formal ﬁxed income loan (non-contingent) and a bad type if they have securitized their
22We use the 2-step procedure outlined in Wooldridge [2002]
23Only 5% of formal loans are unsecuritized compared to 56% of microﬁnance loans and 64% of informal
loans
21formal loan with anything else.24 Using this classiﬁcation among households that both
have outside employment and formal land title, we have 128 good types and 72 bad. The
good types get signiﬁcantly larger formal loans and more years of schooling (see table 6,
diﬀerences in bold are signiﬁcant at the 5% level or greater).
Table 6: Households with Land Titles and Salary
Types LogFormLoan LogAssets Inc/povline HHeduc ConcernRepay
Good 6.467958 17.92066 5.441371 12.03516 .125
Bad 5.836268 17.71765 4.606819 8.951389 .2083333
Source: BRI MASS 2002 data set
Though our interest is primarily in formal land titles and their direct and indirect use,
we can also carry out this same exercise (see table 7) with those who have both other land
documents and salary. Again we compare the diﬀerences between those that choose ﬁxed
income loans (N=54) and those that choose other contingent contracts (N=42). We see that
while there are some diﬀerences between these two groups, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence is
that the bad group is more concerned about loan repayment. This suggests that having a
title makes it easier for types to separate via contract choice. If title was not acting as an
indirect signal in this way then we would expect to see the same separation among these
other-documented types. Since despite their lack of formal land title they still have the
opportunity to choose non-contingent ﬁxed income loans and therefore reveal something
about their “goodness”.
Table 7: Households with Other Land Documents and Salary
Types LogFormLoan LogAssets Inc/povline HHeduc ConcernRepay
Good 6.37571 17.37454 5.906893 10.36111 .0185185
Bad 6.114259 17.62744 5.112355 9.47619 .1190476
Source: BRI MASS 2002 data set
6.6 Does the Eﬀect of Title Vary?
We would also like to extend the results from section 6.2 to allow for systematic variation
in the coeﬃcient on title. We are especially interested to see if the eﬀect of title is diﬀerent
across areas with diﬀerent concentrations of land title. For instance if the eﬀect of title
is only signiﬁcant in areas with high concentrations of titled land then one might argue
that it is only after there is a large scale titling movement that banks change their lending
policies to require title. Therefore it is more a matter of requirements than a question of
24In the sense that this contract is contingent because if the household is unable to repay, the bank will
have to attempt to collect the security.
22signaling. Alternatively one might expect that titles will signal the most information in
areas with low concentrations of title. But here one might have a diﬀerent problem. Since
so few people have titles, banks use completely diﬀerent methods of gathering information
and enforcing repayment. Therefore a land title is irrelevant to the credit decision but for
diﬀerent reasons.
Since we only have a sample of 20 households for each village in the MASS data set, to
construct our measure of the concentration of titled land in a village, we turn to PODES
2003 data set. We divide the number of titled hectares by the total village area as reported
by the village head to calculate the percentage of titled land in each village in our MASS
data set. We then divide our sample into three sections, villages where less than 20% of the
land is titled (the low group), villages where between 20% and 70% of the land is titled (the
medium group) and villages where more than 70% of the land is titled (the high group).
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Figure 2:
present the bivariate probit model to measure the eﬀect of title on the probability of ever
having had a formal bank loan, instrumenting for title with household age and rice paddy as
before. We see that the population that was driving the signiﬁcant positive result reported
in column (3) in table 9 is the middle group. In fact this is the only group in which the
eﬀect of title is positive and signiﬁcant. For households that live in areas where 20 to 70%
of the land is titled having a title increases the probability of having had a formal bank
loan by 54%.
23This provides us with at least indirect evidence of our signaling story. If the eﬀect of title
was due to its value as collateral the eﬀect would be predicted to be the same across areas
with diﬀerent concentrations of titled land (or perhaps we would predict a monotonically
stronger eﬀect in the areas with more title because possibly the legal system has adapted
such that the process of collecting titled collateral is more eﬃcient). But the u-shaped eﬀect
that we are observing would be harder to explain if one is not considering the informational
value of title.
7 Conclusion
The approach of this paper has been to tell a story of how land titles might aﬀect an
underdeveloped credit market. Actually there are two stories at play here: the Hernando
de Soto story and the BRI Public Relations story. In the ﬁrst story, land titles are seen
as unleashing the productivity of otherwise ‘dead” assets. It is title’s ability to serve as
collateral that transforms ﬁxed assets into liquidity and back again with ease. In the
second story, sophisticated bankers have already unleashed these assets, including human
and social capital, without the aid of formal land titles.
Our results place us somewhere between these two camps. On the one hand we show
that titles are important determinants of credit access, as measured by whether a household
has ever had a formal loan or been judged feasible for one, and also have some inﬂuence
on loan size.25 But on the other hand we argue that these results are due to signaling not
collateral by showing that possessing a title is more important than oﬀering it as security
and that the eﬀect of title is strongest in areas where titles are neither too rare nor too
common.
It should not be overlooked that BRI and other banks in Indonesia are in favor of titling
programs. This suggests that there are important dynamic eﬀects that should be considered.
How valid our short term results will be depend on the underlying legal institution in
Indonesia. If high legal costs represent in some way the disparity between the formal
system and what various communities across the country want, then change will likely be
slow and the short-term will resemble the long term. Or it may be the case that a large-scale
titling program could generate enough widespread coordination to signiﬁcantly alter legal
or ﬁnancial institutions as Sumarto [2002] suggests.
Our paper poses some new empirical questions in the context of a well-established line of
research. This research program uses institutions to identify and estimate economic eﬀects.
On one hand, institutions should be viewed as exogenous and the results of the analysis are
conditional on the institutional framework (Acemoglu and Johnson [2003]). On the other
hand, most development policies attempt to marginally change institutions and so one must
try to incorporate the institutional framework explicitly. A policy for economic development
25Though here the story is less clear; titles do not eﬀect hypothetical loans amounts either demanded or
supplied.
24must not overlook the institutional constraints. Successful policy implementation requires
adjusting to entrenched aspects of already in-place institutions. This may well be the case
in Indonesia and the LAP II (the newest World Bank land project in Indonesia). However
it has been common not to worry so much about contracting institutions assuming that as
long as they do not function extremely poorly they should not aﬀect the long run outcome.
The story that this paper tells about the credit market and land titling in Indonesia leaves
open the possibility that contracting institutions will interact with property institutions
and inﬂuence the long-run results. If the reader believes that the state of the credit market
today will shape the economy tomorrow in a fundamental way, then foreclosure law, the
ability of households to contract and their relationship with land titles will impact the
positive results of economic analysis in the long-run.
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26Table 8: Linear Probability Model
Dependent Variable = FormalBank OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titled .070∗∗ .090∗∗ .158∗ .989∗∗
(.029) (.035) (.091) (.426)
Log total ﬁxed asset value .077∗∗∗ .074∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗ -.009
(.014) (.016) (.016) (.043)
Income per cap/poverty line -.0003 -.0009 -.0002 -.002
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.003)
Household size .003 -.006 .002 -.006
(.007) (.008) (.008) (.010)
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(.041) (.042) (.040) (.050)
Household head’s education .009∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗ .008∗∗ .003
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.006)
Has salary .119∗∗∗ .153∗∗∗ .110∗∗∗ .151∗∗∗
(.027) (.030) (.028) (.038)
Years in village -.0001 .0004 -.0002 -.0002
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.001)
Log distance to bank -.089∗∗∗ -.066 -.079∗∗∗ .078
(.029) (.044) (.030) (.092)
Village has Bank .043 .048 .048 .035
(.034) (.052) (.033) (.063)
Population Density -.0009∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0006)
Mean income/povline in village .038∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .020
(.007) (.009) (.007) (.013)
Village has registered council .019 .133∗ .018 .019
(.027) (.077) (.027) (.111)
Mean years land is held in village .0003 .003 .002 .003
(.002) (.004) (.003) (.005)
With Subdistrict Dummies No Yes No Yes
N 1270 1270 1269 1269
Adjusted R2 .186 .224 .18 -.248
Joint F-test for instruments in ﬁrst stage 53.68 5.43
Hansen J (overident. test for all instruments) 6.45 .014
χ2(1) P-value .011 .905
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
27Table 9: Marginal Eﬀects
Dependent Variable = FormalBank Probit Bivariate Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titled .075∗∗ .107∗∗∗ .221∗∗∗ .212∗∗
(.031) (.039) (.082) (.108)
Log total ﬁxed asset value .091∗∗∗ .093∗∗∗ .056∗∗∗ .029∗
(.018) (.021) (.017) (.016)
Income per cap/poverty line -.002 -.003 -.001 -.001
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.001)
Household size .002 -.005 .0003 -.002
(.009) (.010) (.006) (.004)
Female household head -.033 -.033 -.030 -.014
(.044) (.047) (.029) (.018)
Household head’s education .009∗∗ .013∗∗∗ .005 .004
(.004) (.005) (.003) (.003)
Has salary .135∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗ .099∗∗∗ .104∗∗
(.029) (.034) (.030) (.044)
Years in village -.0004 .0002 -.0003 .0000
(.0009) (.001) (.0006) (.0004)
Log distance to bank -.118∗∗∗ -.093 -.070∗ -.023
(.042) (.059) (.036) (.028)
Village has Bank .037 .056 .036 .025
(.035) (.058) (.027) (.026)
Population Density -.0009∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗ -.0009∗∗∗ -.0006∗∗
(.0003) (.0005) (.0002) (.0003)
Mean income/povline in village .037∗∗∗ .032∗∗∗ .023∗∗∗ .011∗
(.007) (.010) (.006) (.006)
Village has registered council .025 .111 .016 .030
(.031) (.075) (.023) (.027)
Mean years land is held in village .0001 .001 .002 .0005
(.003) (.005) (.002) (.002)
With Subdistrict Dummies No Yes No Yes
N 1270 1193 1269 1269
Log-Likelihood or Pseudo LL -633 -584 -1244 -1021
Pseudo R2 .174 .21
ρ -.307 -.353
Wald test of ρ = 0χ2(1) 3.79 3.39
P-value .052 .066
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
28Table 10: Marginal Eﬀects at Mean
Dependent Variable = FormalBank Probit
(1) (2)
Log land value w/title .018∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗
(.004) (.004)
Log land value w/other document .011∗∗∗ .006
(.004) (.005)
Log other assets .007∗∗∗ .010∗∗∗
(.003) (.003)
Income per cap/poverty line .0009 .0002
(.004) (.004)
Household size .004 -.004
(.009) (.010)
Female household head -.027 -.023
(.044) (.048)
Household head’s education .012∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗
(.004) (.005)
Has salary .118∗∗∗ .173∗∗∗
(.029) (.034)
Years in village -.0002 .0007
(.0009) (.001)
Log distance to bank -.118∗∗∗ -.104∗
(.042) (.058)
Village has bank .051 .065
(.035) (.059)
Population density -.0009∗∗∗ -.001∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0005)
Mean income/povline in village .041∗∗∗ .040∗∗∗
(.007) (.010)
Village has registered council .034 .063
(.031) (.082)
Mean yrs land is held in village .002 .003
(.003) (.005)
With Subdistrict Dummies No Yes
N 1270 1193
Log-Likelihood -647.558 -594.277
Pseudo R2 .156 .196
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
29Table 11: Marginal Eﬀects on Hypothetical Credit Supply
Dependent Variable = Feasible Probit Bivariate Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titled .023 .061 .108 .314∗∗
(.033) (.042) (.088) (.160)
Log total ﬁxed asset value .123∗∗∗ .126∗∗∗ .114∗∗∗ .115∗∗∗
(.020) (.025) (.019) (.037)
Income per cap/poverty line .035∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗ .034∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.009)
Household size .008 .005 .007 .005
(.009) (.010) (.009) (.012)
Female household head .031 .045 .025 .041
(.049) (.051) (.048) (.060)
Household head’s education .014∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗ .013∗∗∗ .015∗∗
(.004) (.005) (.004) (.006)
Has salary -.195∗∗∗ -.461∗∗∗ -.157∗∗∗ -.174∗∗∗
(.031) (.037) (.038) (.042)
Years in village -.001∗ -.002∗ -.001 -.002∗∗
(.0009) (.001) (.0009) (.001)
Log distance to bank -.024 -.075 -.011 -.030
(.035) (.051) (.036) (.069)
Village has Bank .006 .054 .010 .076
(.038) (.057) (.038) (.070)
Population Density -.0006∗ -.001∗∗ -.0008∗ -.002∗∗∗
(.0003) (.0005) (.0004) (.0006)
Mean income/povline in village .009 .019 .007 .018
(.008) (.013) (.008) (.015)
Village has registered council -.008 .249∗ -.009 .257∗∗
(.031) (.137) (.031) (.131)
Mean years land is held in village -.001 .005 .0007 .006
(.003) (.005) (.003) (.006)
With Subdistrict Dummies No Yes No Yes
N 1252 1213 1251 1251
Log-Likelihood or Pseudo LL -661 -570 -1256 -998
Pseudo R2 .167 .267
ρ -.192 -.490
Wald test of ρ = 0χ2(1) 1.04 1.99
P-value .308 .158
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
30Table 12: Hypothetical Credit Supply




Has had loan from formal bank 2.465∗∗∗ 2.173∗∗∗
(.304) (.266)
Log total ﬁxed asset value 1.137∗∗∗ .977∗∗∗
(.143) (.129)
Income per cap/poverty line .103∗∗∗ .08∗∗∗
(.03) (.026)
Household size .003 -.006
(.081) (.074)
Female household head .569 .537
(.44) (.396)
Household head’s education .138∗∗∗ .129∗∗∗
(.04) (.036)
Has salary -1.666∗∗∗ -1.524∗∗∗
(.295) (.268)
Years in village -.024∗∗∗ -.021∗∗∗
(.008) (.008)
Log distance to bank -.457 -.446
(.472) (.425)
Village has bank .636 .651
(.502) (.448)
Population density -.007 -.009∗∗
(.004) (.004)
Mean income/povline in village -.06 -.055
(.092) (.081)
Village has registered council -.272 -.422
(.787) (.691)




Adjusted/Pseudo R2 .496 .085
Note: Marginal eﬀects for Tobit are conditional on being uncensored.
All with subdistrict ﬁxed eﬀects.
31Table 13: Formal Credit Demand of the “Unbanked”




Log total ﬁxed asset value .372∗∗∗ .487∗∗∗
(.051) (.056)
Income per cap/poverty line .041∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗
(.009) (.011)
Household size .056∗∗ .053∗∗
(.024) (.025)
Female household head -.170 -.166
(.154) (.157)
Household head’s education .054∗∗∗ .073∗∗∗
(.011) (.013)
Has salary -.234∗∗ .005
(.092) (.100)
Years in village -.003 -.002
(.002) (.003)
Population density -.002 -.003∗∗
(.001) (.002)
Mean income/povline in village .027 .071∗∗
(.031) (.031)
Village has registered council .379 .599∗∗
(.264) (.249)






χ2(1) LR test of ρ = 0 41.76
P-value .000
Log-likelihood -1495
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
All with subdistrict ﬁxed eﬀects.
32Table 14: Loan Size
Dependent Variable = LogFormalLoanAmts OLS IV Heckman Heck-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titled .276∗ -1.942 .355∗∗ .659∗
(.154) (1.265) (.161) (.372)
More than one past loan .247∗∗ .397∗∗ .254∗∗ .246∗∗
(.118) (.165) (.111) (.112)
Log total ﬁxed asset value .026 .177 .104 .254∗
(.06) (.111) (.074) (.132)
Income per cap/poverty line .039∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗
(.013) (.019) (.012) (.012)
Household size -.046 -.031 -.056 -.068∗
(.035) (.043) (.035) (.035)
Female household head .086 .283 .032 -.037
(.206) (.27) (.199) (.204)
Household head’s education .026 .035∗ .033∗ .056∗∗
(.016) (.02) (.017) (.024)
Has salary -.015 -.129 .146 .455
(.119) (.157) (.146) (.278)
Years in village -.008∗∗ -.005 -.008∗∗ -.008∗∗
(.004) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Population density -.001 .002 -.002 -.004
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Mean income/povline in village .005 .013 .028 .073
(.035) (.042) (.036) (.049)
Village has registered council .288 .728∗ .391 .57∗
(.304) (.44) (.295) (.31)
Mean yrs land is held in village .008 -.006 .012 .014
(.019) (.024) (.018) (.018)
Inverse Mills Ratio .424 1.281∗
(.253) (.067)
N 368 368 364 364
Censored Observations 899 899
Joint F-test for instruments in ﬁrst stage 3.49 51.15
Sargan (overident. test for all instruments) .014 .906
χ2(1) P-value on Sargan .907 .341
ρ .450
χ2(1) LR test of ρ = 0 1.66
P-value .198
Adjusted R2 .119
Note: All with subdistrict ﬁxed eﬀects
33Table 15: Security Oﬀered




Land title security .234 .228
(.155) (.147)
Fixed Income .101 .073
(.152) (.143)
Other security .006 -.059
(.203) (.187)
No Security -.443∗∗ -.473∗∗∗
(.202) (.183)
More than one past loan .135 .144∗
(.083) (.077)
Log total ﬁxed asset value .042 .075∗∗∗
(.025) (.028)
Income per cap/poverty line .035∗∗∗ .035∗∗∗
(.008) (.008)
Household size .034 .015
(.026) (.028)
Female household head -.092 -.132
(.140) (.141)
Household head’s education .024∗∗ .049∗∗∗
(.012) (.014)
Has salary -.158∗ .025
(.091) (.104)
Years in village -.009∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗
(.003) (.003)
Population density -.001 -.002
(.002) (.002)
Mean income/povline in village .006 .051∗
(.025) (.027)
Village has registered council .062 .095
(.201) (.206)









Note: Missing category is oﬀering other land documents security
All with subdistrict ﬁxed eﬀects.
34Table 16: Marginal Eﬀects on Pr(FormalBank=1) at Median from Bivarite Probit
Dependent Variable = FormalBank Low % Titled Medium % High %
(1) (2) (3)
Titled -.012 .543∗∗∗ -.143
(.109) (.048) (.431)
Log total ﬁxed asset value .101∗∗∗ .004 .123∗∗
(.033) (.025) (.050)
Income per cap/poverty line .006 -.010 -.0004
(.005) (.012) (.008)
Household size .015 -.004 -.027
(.013) (.020) (.019)
Female household head -.074 .112 -.038
(.060) (.075) (.075)
Household head’s education .009∗ .008 .001
(.006) (.009) (.008)
Has salary .053 .121∗ .179∗∗
(.046) (.063) (.075)
Years in village -.0004 -.001 -.00003
(.001) (.002) (.002)
Log distance to bank -.203∗∗ .011 .028
(.083) (.083) (.124)
Village has bank -.065 -.458∗∗∗ .008
(.064) (.151) (.081)
Population density -.002∗∗∗ -.0002 .0004
(.0004) (.0009) (.0007)
Mean income/povline in village .025 .088∗∗∗ .064
(.016) (.028) (.054)
Village has registered council .081∗∗ .374∗∗∗ -.007
(.041) (.139) (.177)
Mean yrs land is held in village .004 -.014 -.003
(.004) (.010) (.015)
N 613 196 186
Log pseudo-likelihood -560 -172 -160
ρ .153 0 .517
Wald test of ρ = 0χ2(1)
P-value
Pr(formalbank=1) .230 .740 .160
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
35